All selector (:all). A selector that places no restriction on the arguments. An operation
whose only selector is :all accepts any arguments.
Anchored export. One archive object that holds a consumption chain's rows, its start and end boundary anchors, and any key transitions, verified as a whole to the exact end of the object, its digest, and an out-of-band object version. See Evidence.
Archive key. A key that signs boundary anchors and key transitions. It has a validity window
and is passed to the verifier as a HistoricalPublicKey.
Assemble. Combine a signing input and a signature into the compact JWS (assemble_compact/2).
Assembly checks the signature's form and refuses one no conforming signer emits; it never
verifies the signature and never rewrites it.
Audience (aud). The services a grant is valid for. The verifier checks that the audience
you expect is one of the grant's audiences, exactly.
Boundary anchor. A signed statement (typ: "ba+chain-anchor") that a chain had a given
sequence and head at a given time.
Bounds. The resource limits applied while decoding and verifying (BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds).
Each has a protocol maximum; a caller may only tighten them.
Cast arguments. The operation's arguments after the service has parsed and cast them to the operation's declared types, in the tagged JSON form. The proof binds a digest of the operation and the cast arguments.
Certified corpus. A conformance corpus whose index.json SHA-256 is pinned by the CLI and
every implementation. Every case states its expected verdict or output.
Compact (JWS). The three-part header.payload.signature form, each part base64url-encoded,
in which grants, proofs, anchors, transitions, attestations, and assertions travel.
Consumption chain. Hash-linked rows, one per accepted invocation, each carrying a 32-byte commitment the host computes.
Content assertion. A sibling attestation profile (typ: "ba+content-assertion") that binds
the digest of exact content bytes to a context and a lineage.
Contract-major. A complete, closed wire profile, numbered 1, 2, and 3 so far, with its own
namespace (V1, V2, V3), suite, specification, and corpus. Not a package version: one
package release carries several contract-majors.
Facts. The redacted result of a successful verification, such as GrantFacts or
EnvelopeFacts. Facts carry identifiers, digests, and times, never raw keys, signatures,
nonces, or arguments, and they are never an authorization: authorization: :not_evaluated or
trust: :not_evaluated.
Grant. A capability the issuer signs (typ: "ba+cap"): the holder's key thumbprint, the
audiences, a validity window, and the operations the holder may invoke, each with selectors.
Holder. The party that holds the key a grant names and signs a proof for each request.
Holder thumbprint (cnf.jkt). The RFC 7638 SHA-256 thumbprint of the holder's public key.
The package handles it as raw 32 bytes.
Invocation id. A fresh identifier per request, carried in the proof. The host reserves it in its replay store; the package only checks that it matches what you expect.
Issuer. The party that signs grants. The verifier trusts an issuer key only because you pass
it in TrustedIssuer.
Key acceptance. The check a public key passes before it may enter a verification input:
Ed25519.acceptable_public_key?/1 or Es256.acceptable_public_key?/1.
Key transition. A signed statement (typ: "ba+key-transition") in which the current archive
key authenticates its successor.
Low S. For ES256, the canonical member of each pair of valid signatures (r, s) and
(r, n - s): the one with s <= n/2. Contract-major 3 accepts only low-S signatures.
Nonce. An optional server-issued challenge the proof must carry when the service requires one. The local-loopback profile always requires it.
Operation. A named action a grant permits, with its selectors. The service maps its own route to the operation name; the client never chooses it.
Package 1.x. A release line of the Hex package. The API stability page lists what it promises.
Proof (proof of possession). A per-request signature by the holder (typ: "dpop+jwt") that
binds the grant, the method, the target URI, the invocation id, the operation, the argument
digest, and the time.
Profile. A closed wire format with its own typ or v value, specification, and corpus: a
contract-major or a sibling profile.
Role attestation. A sibling attestation profile (typ: "ba+role-attestation") in which an
attestor key binds a subject key to the issuer or holder role.
Selector. A restriction on one argument path: equals, one_of, all, and, from
contract-major 2, lte and gte.
Sibling profile. A byte-distinct profile beside the contract-majors, with its own protected
typ and API: local-loopback HTTP proofs, role attestations, and content assertions.
Signing input. The exact bytes to sign for a protocol object (message), returned by the
*_signing_input/2 producers.
Soundness repair. An erratum that changes verdicts only from accept to reject, on inputs no conforming producer emits, under the conditions in governance.
Strict Ed25519. The one Ed25519 verification rule every surface applies: canonical
encodings, no small-order key or R, S below the group order, and the cofactorless equation.
Suite. The named combination of signature algorithm, digest, and domain separators of a
contract-major: BAP1-Ed25519-SHA256, BAP2-Ed25519-SHA256, BAP3-ES256-SHA256.
Tagged JSON. The package's JSON value form, which keeps integers and floats apart and
preserves member order: :null, {:boolean, b}, {:integer, i}, {:float, f},
{:string, s}, {:array, values}, and {:object, members}.
Torsion-free. An Ed25519 key with no small-order component. Hosts check it with
Ed25519.torsion_free?/1 at enrollment, at trust install, and before revocation comparisons.
Untrusted key locator. untrusted_key_locator/2: reads only the kid from a compact's
protected header, as a lookup hint with trust: :not_evaluated.