Explicit expected context for combined raw-envelope verification.

Every value here comes from the caller's own request handling and records, never from the credentials being checked. The same struct serves contract-majors 1, 2 and 3 and the local-loopback HTTP profile (which requires a nonce).

Fields

• trusted_issuer - the BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.TrustedIssuer your service already trusts.
• issuer - the expected grant iss, compared byte-for-byte.
• audience - one audience your service answers to; the grant's aud must contain it.
• method - the request method as received, compared byte-for-byte (never case-normalized).
• target_uri - the request target as your server derives it, already in normal form (BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Uri.normalize/2).
• invocation_id - the lowercase RFC 4122 UUID your service assigned to this invocation.
• operation - the operation name the request performs.
• cast_arguments - the typed arguments your server derived from the request, as a tagged BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Json.value(); every selector of the operation must accept them. Redacted by inspect/2.
• evaluation_time - the caller's current time, integer Unix time in seconds; the library reads no clock.
• clock_skew - the tolerated clock skew in seconds, 0 to clock_skew (60).
• proof_max_age - the maximum proof age in seconds, 1 to proof_max_age (300).
• nonce - :not_required (the proof must carry no nonce) or {:required, nonce} (the proof must carry exactly nonce). The nonce is redacted by inspect/2.
• bounds - a BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds struct or a map of tightening overrides; %{} means the profile maxima (see BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.coerce/1).