BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1 (Bounded Authority Protocol v1.0.0)

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Explicit standalone content-assertion profile: signatures bind exact content digests, caller-supplied context and a bounded window. Verification never grants authority. The caller owns content semantics, trusted key selection, replay and durable lineage state.

Summary

Producers

assemble_compact(input, signature)

Assembles and revalidates this profile at the maximum bounds.

assemble_compact(input, signature, limits)

Assembles and revalidates this profile under tightened bounds.

assertion_digest(compact, limits)

Hashes exact profile-parseable compact bytes; establishes no signature or trust.

assertion_signing_input(assertion, limits)

Produces deterministic signing bytes for this closed profile.

content_digest(bytes, limits)

Hashes nonempty exact content bytes in the fixed content domain; never parses them.

Decoders

decode_assertion(compact, limits)

Decodes bounded fields without evaluating the signature or trust.

Verifiers

verify_assertion(compact, expected)

Verifies against explicit public trust, complete expected context and time.

verify_successor(previous, next, limits)

Checks pairwise lineage facts; caller owns their provenance, current trust and high-water state.

Producers

assemble_compact(input, signature)

@spec assemble_compact(BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(), binary()) ::
  {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}

Assembles and revalidates this profile at the maximum bounds.

assemble_compact(input, signature, limits)

@spec assemble_compact(
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t(),
  binary(),
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()
) :: {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}

Assembles and revalidates this profile under tightened bounds.

Since 0.9.0, assembly also refuses, with {:error, :invalid}, a signature that no conforming signer emits: an Ed25519 signature whose S is not below the group order or whose R is non-canonical or of small order (erratum 3). It never rewrites the signature bytes it accepts.

assertion_digest(compact, limits)

@spec assertion_digest(binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()) ::
  {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}

Hashes exact profile-parseable compact bytes; establishes no signature or trust.

assertion_signing_input(assertion, limits)

@spec assertion_signing_input(
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.ContentAssertion.t(),
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()
) :: {:ok, BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.SigningInput.t()} | {:error, :invalid}

Produces deterministic signing bytes for this closed profile.

content_digest(bytes, limits)

@spec content_digest(binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()) ::
  {:ok, binary()} | {:error, :invalid}

Hashes nonempty exact content bytes in the fixed content domain; never parses them.

Decoders

decode_assertion(compact, limits)

@spec decode_assertion(binary(), BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()) ::
  {:ok,
   BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.DecodedContentAssertion.t()}
  | {:error, :invalid}

Decodes bounded fields without evaluating the signature or trust.

Verifiers

verify_assertion(compact, expected)

@spec verify_assertion(
  binary(),
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.ExpectedContentAssertion.t()
) ::
  {:ok, BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.ContentAssertionFacts.t()}
  | {:error, :invalid}

Verifies against explicit public trust, complete expected context and time.

verify_successor(previous, next, limits)

@spec verify_successor(
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.ContentAssertionFacts.t(),
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.ContentAssertion.V1.ContentAssertionFacts.t(),
  BoundedAuthorityProtocol.V1.Bounds.t() | map()
) :: :ok | {:error, :invalid}

Checks pairwise lineage facts; caller owns their provenance, current trust and high-water state.